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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
EDWIN F. RUSSELL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 9648

vs.

GRANT L. VALEN'TINE,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT 'OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the lessor, plaintiff, against
defendant, lessee, to determine if a lease terminated, because the renewal provision of the lease was
void for indefiniteness, vagueness and uncertainty.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court, sitting without a jury. Judgment was entered for the pl aintiff.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks reversal of the Judgment,
and Judgment in favor of the defendant as a matter of law, that the lease has not terminated, and
was renewed for ten years.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Edwin F. Russell, the owner of
real property located in Roy, Weber County, Utah,
entered into a lease on the 29th day of May, 1950,
as lessor, with Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., of
Salt Lake City, lessee. The lease "\Vas for a period
of ten years, commencing the first day of June,
1950. The lease contained a provision, Paragraph
8, providing for renewal of the lease (Exhibit 1).
Grant L. Valentine, the defendant, is the assignee of the lease, through successive assignments,
and occupied the premises as assignee of the lease
from the 30th day of October, 1954 (Exhibit 4).
The renewal provision of the lease required the
lessee to give the lessor notice in writing, thirty days
prior to the expiration of the lease that he desired
renewal of the same. Grant L. Valentine, on April
29, 1960, gave written notice to Edwin F. Russell
of his desire to renew the lease, pursuant to the
provisions of Paragraph 8 of said lease, and in all
particulars complied with the requirements of the
lease, as to notice of renewal (Exhibit 8) .
The plaintiff filed this action to have the court
declare the lease terminated, contending that the
renewal clause was vague, ambiguous, indefinite
and uncertain ( R. 2) . The lease was prepared by
the attorney for the original lessee, Mr. C. N. Ottosen, of Salt Lake City (T. 5). The trial judge's
2
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Finding of Fact, Paragraph 8, states the provisions
of Paragraph 8 referring to renewal were ambiguous, indefinite and uncertain, and incapable of
enforcement (R. 22). The court found that the lease
terminated a:t the end of the ten year period, and
could not be renewed because of the ambiguity, indefitenesiS 'and uncertainty of the renewal clause
( R. 2·2). 'The court held, as a Conclusion of Law,
(R. 23), and entered Judgment that the lease terminated the 31st day of May, 1960 (R. 25).
The paragraph of the lease, which is the subject of this lawsuit, defendant's Exhibit 1, provides:
"8. If the Lessee shall keep, observe and
perform all of the terms 'and conditions of
this lease, on his part to be kept and performed, said Lessee shall have the right to renew
this lease for a further period beginning as
of the termination date of this lease, provided
he shall notify the Lessor in writing thirty
days prior to the terms of this agreement that
he desires such renewal and provided, further,
that he shall sign or offer to sign a new lease
upon the same terms and conditions as are
herein contained.''

3
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE LEASE,
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 1, REFERRING TO RENEWAL THEREOF, WERE AMBIGUOUS, INDEFINITE
AND UNCERTAIN AND INCAPABLE OF ENFORCEMEN'T.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING PAROL
TESTIMONY TO EXPLAIN OR INTERPRET THE
TERMS OF THE WRTTTEN LEASE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE LEASE,
DE'FENDANT'S EXHIBIT 1, RE'FERRING TO RENEWAL THEREOF, WERE AMBIGUOUS, INDEFINITE
AND UNCERTAIN AND INCAPABLE OF ENFORCEMEN'T.

I't is the contention of the defendant that Paragraph 8 of the lease, cited above, is clear 'and unambiguous and the intention of the parties was
clearly expressed. It provided for a renewal of the
lea:se, which was to commence on the termination
date of the original lease; that is, M'a,y 31, 1960.
The only uncertainty claimed in the paragraph is
the phrase granting a renewal "for a further
period". Any claimed uncertainty disappears when
the phrase is analyzed and the rules of construction as apply to renewal leruse provisions are considered:
4
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"As a general rule, in construing provisions
relating to renewals, where there is any uncertainty, the tenant is favored and not the
landlord, because the latter, having the power
of stipul'ating in his own favor, has neglected
to do so, and also upon the principle that every
man's grant is to be taken strongly agains t
himself." 32 Am. Jur. Landlord and Tenant,
Section 962, P. 807.
1

Typical of the numerous cases cited in favor
of this proposition is Hughes Realty Company vs.
Breitbach, 98 N.W. 2d. 374 (N.D.), There the court
in discussing the uncertainty which existed in the
1·enewal provision of a lease, stated:
" ... In construing the provisions in the lease
before the court relative to the option to renew any uncertainty in the language of the
option must be construed in favor of the tenant and against the lessor. The lessor had the
power to incorporate terms and conditions
in his own favor, and if he neglected to do so,
he alone is responsible."
1

See also Streicher vs. H eimburg, 272 P. 290 (Cal.
1928) and Christenson vs. Ohrman, 156 P. 2d 848
(Kan.). No authority is cited to the contrary.
It is recognized that generally, ambiguitie'S in
a written contract may be explained by parol testimony, but it is not every uncertainty or difference
of opinion as to the interpretation of 'a given phrase,
which gives rise to such an ambiguity as to make
a written instrument enforceable. Where such a
5
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rule sanctioned, a party to a w.ritten instrument
could, by placing a strained construction upon what
would otherwise be reasonably clear l~nguage, give
himself the .opportunity to introduce parol testimoney to defeat the very purpose of the written instrum,ent. Pulsipher vs. Tolboe, 373 P. 2d 360 (filed
Utah, April2, 1962).
In the pre~ent case, the court found that the
language contained in Paragraph 8 of the lease,
"a further period beginning as of the termination
date of this lease" was so ambiguous and cast such
uncertainty into the instrument as to make the entire paragraph unenforceable (R. 2). It appears
that were it not for the use of the language
cited, defendant would have a right to renew the
lease for ·a ten year period, similar to that of the
first term. 'There is no uncertainty as to the period
of the lease. Further, a careful reading of the entire paragraph makes cle'ar any supposed uncertainty
which exists by reason of the phrase. The word
''renewal", or its equivalent "new lease", is referred
to three times in the paragraph. A condition is
.stated in the same paragraph "that he (lessee) shall
sign or offer to sign a new lease upon the sa~e tetms
,{Lnd conditions as herein contained" (Emphasis
;;tdded). There is nq uncertainty. about the conditions of the lease, and there is no uncertainty as to
the '"term''· of the initial lease.
1

6
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The law in this regard is certain enough to
permit the writer in 32 Am. Jur. Landlord and Tenant, Section '58, P. 807, to state:
"A general covenant to 'renew' implies a renewal on the same terms and for the same
time as the initial lease, and is, therefore,
sufficiently certain to be enforceable."
Similarly, in the Colorado case of Yoman vs.
Levine, 206 P. 2d 596 (Colo. 1949), the court in
holding that one partner was not liable to the other
in a dissolution contract which referred to the renewal of a lease, stated:
"A general covenant to extend or renew implies 'an additional term equal to the first,
and upon the same terms including that of
rent.''
This general statement of law is supported by
numerous authority. Also, in 51 C.J.S. Landlord
and Tenant, Section 71, at Page 619, the following
language appears :
"In the absence of 'an agreement to the contrary, a covenant to extend or renew ordinarily imports a holding on the same terms as
the original lease.
"... In the absence of a provision specifying
the duration of a new term, a covenant to
renew or extend implies an 'additional term
for the same term as the original lease" (Emphasis added) .
In the present case, the renewal paragraph contains a general covenant to renew. Plaintiff does
7
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not dispute this. Uncertainty, if any there be, by
reason of the phrase "for 'a further period" is eliminated by application of the principles of legal
construction. Particularly, is this true when the instrument is construed against the landlord and in
favor of the tenant. An attempt to make it uncertain
is not a reasonable construction and runs contrary
to the ~admitted intention of the parties to renew
the lease as expressed in the plain language of the
contract.
Mr. Russell, the lessor, knew of the }anguage
in the lease, and read it before signing. (T. 26).
Were he not satisfied with the plain intent expressed
in Paragraph 8, he was in a position to have it
changed, or refuse to sign the lease. Knowing of the
language, and being satisfied with it, he signed the
le~ase and granted the lessee the privileges clearly
~stated.

It is submitted that when an ordinary meaning,
common sense construction is given to the language
in question, it is made clear and unambiguous.
"The lexicographers generally give 'period'
as a synonym of 'term' ... Black's Law Dictionary states: 'Term' signifies the bounds,
limitation or extension of time by which an
estate is granted as when a man holds an
estate for any limited or specific number of
years, ... " Martinez vs. Rocky Mountain &
S. F. Ry. Co., 47 P. '2d 903, 905 (N.M.).
See also: Ex rel John Jay Healey vs. Leask,
67 N.Y. 529 (N.Y.).
8
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Webster's N e1v International Dictionary, Unabridged, Second Edition, defines 'period' as
"a division of time, series of years, months or
days in which something is completed . . . "
The only "period", "term" or '·'division" of
time referred to in the lease is a 10 year period. A
renewal of the lease "period" could only refer to
an extension of the lease for another 10 year term.
The term "further" means additional. Thompson vs. Southern Railroad Company, 116 Fed. 890
(U.S.D.C. Ala). The san1e definition is contained in
Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged, Second Edition. In Raynolds vs. Browning, King
and Cornpany, 205 N. Y.S. 748 (N.Y.), the court
held the use of the word "further" in a lease meant
"a continuation or renewal of the original period."
Thus, the language convained in the lease, " ...
said lessee shall have the right to renew this lease
for a further period beginning as of the termination of this lease", is rendered clear and unambiguous. The words "to renew" mean "to begin again",
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Second Edition, ·and "for a further period", clearly indicates
an additional term equivalent to the only period
mentioned in the lease; namely, ten years. Thus, the
provision clearly provided an extension of the lease
for an additional period of ten years to begin upon
termination of the original lease.
The words "right to renew this lease" are not
9
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ambiguous, nor do they have any other meaning
than that the lessee, upon meeting the conditions
of the lease, should have the lease renewed. By all
definitions the word "further" means "additional",
and by the rule of construction of legal documents
"a further period" would mean for an additional
period of time. That period of time, in relation to
renewal, could only mean the same number or series
of years; that is ten years, as set forth in the lease.
In addition to the foregoing, -cases construing
similar language contained in other leases, indicate
that the phrase as used in the present lease should
be upheld as unambiguous and the renewal provision of the lease enforced.
The case of Starr vs. Holck, 28 N.W. 2d 289
(Mich., 1947), is typical of the cases considering
this problem. A provision was contained in that
lease as follows:
"4. At the expiration of this lease, if said
second party shall have made all payments
therein specified and compiled with all its
terms in time and manner as therein· set
forth, he or they shall be entitled to an extension thereof for ________ years on the same
terms as therein set forth, and the covenants
of this lease shall apply to all extensions
thereof, and the extensions be treated as if
a part of the original term.''
The court in. observing the firmly established
principle that "ambig~ous provisions in. a lease ...
10
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must be construed against the lessor" held that:
"The provisions of the lease with reference
to the privilege of extension on the part of the
lessees may not be ignored because of the failure of the parties to fill out the blank. Such
failure may well be regarded as indicating
that the lessors either did not care to specify
a definite term for the extension or did not
think it necessary to do so . . ."
The court found that it constituted an extension for at least one year.
In the case of Metcalf Auto Company vs. Norton, 109 A. 384, (Me., 1920), the defendant leased
the property to the plaintiff for five years. The
lease contained the following provision:
"With the privilege on the part of the lessee
to release at the end of said term for a term
of years to be agreed upon at the same rental
... " (Emphasis added) .
Against a claim by the defendant that the
renewal term was indefinite because the phrase,
"a term of years to be agreed upon" me~ans no more
than "a term to be agreed upon", the court stated:
" ... If the language of a contract is reasonably susceptible to two constructions, the interpretation should ordinarily be ~adopted
which gives the words some meaning, other
than another which leaves them meaningless."
The court held that the language meant an
extension of two years and as much longer as the
parties might agree.
11
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In the case of Miller vs. Clemons, 276 S.W.
2d 650, 651, (Ky. 19'55), the construction of a renewal provision of a five ye'ar lease was before
the court. The provision in question stated:
"This lease covers a period of five years from
date, with a privilege of renewing it at the
expiration for additional years at the same
price." (Emphasis added).
The lessee timely notified the lessor of his intention to renew the lease "for a five year period".
The lessor refused to extend the lease and suit
followed. The trial court held that the lessee was
entitled to an extension of two years. The Supreme
Court in rejecting this restricted construction stated:
''We think the trial court erred in limiting
the renewal period to two years. Clemons
was given the privilege of renewing the lease
at its expiration 'for additional years at the
same price'. It was the trial court's view
that 'additional years' meant 'more than one
ye'ar, or at least two years'.
"In 32 Am. Jur. Landlord and Tenant, Section 958, H is said that a general covenant to
'renew' implies a renewal on the same terms
and for the same time as the original lease
and is sufficiently certain to be enforceable.
We think the renewal provision under consideration has the essential characteristics of
a general covenant. In addirtion to authorizing
a renewal it referred to additional years at
the same price. It is our view that the expression 'additional years at the same price'
related back to the original period of the
12
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lease, namely, five years." (Emphasis added)
See also Cunningham vs. Pattee, 99 Mass. 248.
Our own court in the case of Cummings vs.
Rytting, 116 Utah 1, 207 P. 2d 804, had before it
the problem of construing a renewal provision of
a lease whi'ch provided:
"To have and to hold the said premises, together with the appurtenances, unto the said
lessee, his executors, administrators and assigns, from the 15th day of April, A.D., 1940,
for and during and until the 15th day of
April, A.D., 194'5, a term of five years. With
a five year option."
It was claimed th'at the phrase "with a five year
option was so indefinite and ambiguous as to 'be
meaningless.
The Supreme Court rejected this contention as
having no merit. The court found that the context
of the provision clearly indicated that it was the
intent of the lessor to grant an option to the lessee
to have and to hold for an additional term of five
years. In this connection the court stated:
"Where the covenant for ~a renewal is general
and does not state the 1term of the renewal
lease, then the lease is to be upon the same
general terms and conditions as the old lease,
which are to be applicable to the renewal
period.'' (citing cases)
1

It is submitted that the renewal provision of
the present l~ase is not ambiguous and states with
13
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sufficient clarity the intention of the lessor to grant
an option to renew the lease. The words "for a further period", when read in context, rather than make
the lease ambiguous or indefinite, serve to clarify
the term of the renewal by referring to the only lease
period mentioned in the instrument.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING PAROL
TESTI MONY TO EXPLAIN OR INTERPRET THE
TERMS OF THE WRrTTEN LE~SE.
1

Over the objection of the defendant's attorney,
the plaintiff 'and the plaintiff''s witnesses were permitted to testify concerning conversations which
pre-dated the signing of the lease (T. 9, 24). Mr.
Duane E. Fuller, the Secretary of the Self-Service
Enterprises, Inc., the in'itial lessee (defendant's assignor) testified that after negotiations with the
plaintiff he "drew up the rough draft of the lease"
and then presented it to their attorney, Mr. C. N.
Ottosen in Salt Lake City for final preparation
( T. 4) . This testimony is contrary to the finding
made by the court that Mr. Fuller ''after consultation with its attorney" prepared and drew the lease
( R. 21). The court made the following Finding:
"'The court further finds that prior to the
signing of said lease, Duane E. Fuller, Secretary of Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., negotiated with the plaintiff for said lease and
held meetings and conversations with the
plain tiff concerning said lease and the term
14
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of said proposed lease, during such meetings
and conversations, Duane E. Fuller, in behalf of Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., requested that the plain tiff grant to Self-Service
Enterprises, Inc., an option of renewal of said
lease for an :;tddi tional ten year period beyond
June 1, 1960, but the plaintiff refused to enter into a lease to g:rant the Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., a right or option to renew or
extend the lease beyond the ten ye'ar period,
beginning with June 1, 1960, and that in the
wording of Paragraph 8 thereof, it was not
intended, by the parties to the lease, thereby
to grant Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., a right
of renewal of said lease for 'a period of ten
years, beginning June 1, 1960, and that both
the Self-Service Enterprises, Inc., and the
plaintiff so conls,trued said lease at the execution thereof." (R. 21)
The testimony upoh wnich this Finding of Fact
is allegedly based was objected to specifically by the
defendant's attorney in this language:
''May I for the record have one more objection. I object to any and 'all of these conversations on the ground and for the reason that
all negotiations and all conversations and 'all
dealings have been merged in the .written
instrument, and any testimony as to what
their negotiations and conversations were before it had been merged in the written instrument are un'admissible to show any other
agreement because they are in the written
instrument." (T. 9)
'. ~
.
A similar objection was made· by the defendant's a_ttorney when ~he plaintiff \vas wsked con15
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cerning his interpretation of the instrument and
discussions and testimony concerning conversations
held prior to the time the instrument was executed
(T. 24). The testimony was admitted conditionally
(T. 24), and was later admitted by the court without restriction.
The law is well settled in Utah that preliminary
negotiations are merged in a written instrument,
and the instrument itself is to be looked to in determining the intention of the parties. Typical of the
many cases announcing and reaffirming this rule
is Ephriam Theatre Company vs. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d
163, 321 P. 2d 221. Justice Crockett writing for a
unanimous court states:
''In considering the controversy here, it is well
to keep in mind the fundamental concepts in
regard to con tracts : That their purpose is to
reduce to writing the conditions upon which
the minds of the parties have met and to fix
their rights and duties in respect thereto ...
Unless there is 'ambiguity or uncertainty in
the language so that the meaning is confused,
or is susceptible to more than one meaning,
there is no justification for interpretation
or explanation from extraneous forces. It
would defeat the very purpose of formal contracts to permit a party to invoke the use of
words or conduct incon'sistent with its terms
to prove that the parties did not mean what
they said, or to use such inconsistent words
or conduct to demonstrate uncertainty or ambiguity where none would otherwise exist.
Generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor
16
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the court has any right to null or modify the
conditions which are purely expressed merely
because it may subject one of the parties to
hardship but there must be enforced 'in accordance with the intention as ... m anifested
by the language used by the parties to the
contract'.''
The court relied upon the following decisions:
Murphy vs. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 29'5, 236 P.
680, 683. See also Richlands Irrigation Company vs.
Westview Irrigation Company, 96 Utah 403, 80 P.
2d 458; Paggii vs. Skliris, 54 Utah 88, 1'79 P. 739;
Johnson vs. Geddes, 49 Utah '137, 161 P. 910.
1

Probably the most recent pronouncement of the
law in this respect is contained in the case of Pulsphier vs. Tolboe, 373 P. 2d 390 (filed April2, 1962).
There the court rejected an attempt to explain the
terms of a written contract by parol testimony and
sa:ted:
"Inasmuch as the language is clear and unambiguous there is no basis for 'interpreting
it' by showing what the intent or the 'understanding' of the defendant was by extraneous
evidence."
The Utah court has frequently considered this
proposition and has consistently followed the principle announced in the Ephriam Theatre case. ·Typical of more recent cases considering the same question is Jensen's Used Cars vs. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276,
323 P. 2d 259. In afffrming the trial court which
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refused to permit the defendant to orally explain a
written instrument, it stated:
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts
we seek to determine the intentions of the
parties, but it is also elementary and of extreme practical importance that we hold contracting parties to their .fair and understandable language deliberately committed to writing and endorsed by them as signa tors thereto.
Were this not so business, one with another
among our citizens, would be relegated to
the chaotic, and the basic purpose of the law
to 'supply enforceable rules of conduct for the
maintenance and improvement of an orderly
society's welfare and providence would find
itself impotent. It is not unreasonable to hold
one responsible for language which he himself
expouses. Such language is the only implement he gives us to fashion a determir~;ation
as to the intentions of the parties. Under such
circumstances he should not be required to
embosom any request that we ignore that fair
!language. This is as it should be. The rule
excluding matters ot~tside the four corners of
a clear, understandable document is a fai1·
one, and one's contentions concerning this intent should extend no further than his own
clear expressions.'' (Emphasis added)
Again in Mathias vs. Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46,
261 P. 2d 952, the following language appears:
"In searching for the meaning the Court must
first examine the language used in the instrument itself and accord to it the weight
and effect which the instrument itself may
show that the parties intend the words to
have. If then its meaning is s~till ambiguous or
18
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uncertain, the court may consider .other contemporaneous writings concerning the, same
subject matter, and may, if it is still uncertain, consider parol evidence of the parties
intention." (Emphasis added)
In Continental Bank and Trust Company vs.
Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P. 2d 773, the court
emphasized that the intent of the:. parties was
to be ascertained first from the four corners of the
instrument. Parol testimony is not to be received
concerning the intention of the parties where any
ambiguity or uncertainty can be reconciled from a
reasonable interpretation of the inS'trument itself.
The case of Wilson vs. Gardner, 10 Utah 2d 89,
348 P. 2d 931, contains another statement by this
court indfca ting that the parol evidence rule precludes oral testimony concerning the events which
precede or accompany the execution of 'a written
instrument :
"In considering a written instrument it is a
judicial function to interpret a written contract which is free from ambiguity 'and does
not require oral testimony to determine its
meaning. Ambiguity in a written instrument
does not appear until the application of pertinent rules of interpretation to the face of
the instrument leaves it generally uncertain
which one of two or more meanings is the
proper meaning." Oliver vs. Nugen,,. 308 P.
2d 13'2, (Kan.1937).
1

It is submitted in_the instant case that when
the applicable rules o£ construction~-are applied to
.
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the language in Paragraph 8 of the lease, that any
ambiguity which may exist is eliminated, and the
instrument is made certain and enforceable.
To give any credence to the stated intended
meaning by Mr. Fuller and Mr. Russell, the clear
language of the paragraph granting a renewal must
be completely ignored. It's position is now even
more incredible when con'Sidered in light of Mr.
Russell's testimony, which is as follows:
"Q. And at the time that the lease was signed, was there a conversation - any conversation - that went on then?
"A. Well, I think no more than I've explained, other than they said they were happy
to make the lease and it was ~a friendly deal,
and just along that line. Everything was completed and they could go forward.
"Q. Was there any discussion between you
and them concerning the wording of the lease,
of paragraph 8, concerning the words, 'a further period'?
"A. No, sir. No, sir. It was just 'a ten-year
lease. That was it.
"Q. Well, a ten-year lease, yes. I'm talking
now about a further period.

* * *
"Q. From the lease itself - you're familiar
with the lease?
''A. Yes, sir.
"Q. In the lease it says it should be renewed
for a further period?
20
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"A. Yes. I knew it was there." (T. 25, 26)
Mr. Fuller testified that the language "to renew this lease for a further period" was inserted
''hoping that Mr. Russell would .go along with it''
(T. 12). The following exerpt from his testimony
is pertinent :
"A. We inserted that in that paragraph hoping that Mr. Russell would go along with it.
"Q. And would sign the lease with that in it?
"A. You bet.
''Q. And it was signed with that in?
"A. You bet.
"Q. In other words, you wanted to go in to
this le'ase. You wanted to have an option to
renew or to sign another lease after ten years?
"A. You bet." (T. 12).
Even if the clause were ·considered ambiguous,
the plain intention of the lessee was to obtain an
option for renewal for an additional ten year period.
The lessor, Mr. Russell, signed the lease well aware
of the l'anguage providing for it. Since the instrument is to be construed against the landlord in accordance with the principles previously announced,
the court committed error in refusing to enforce the
option for renewal.
The testimony which was improperly admitted
by the trial court in permitting the plaintiff and
Mr. Fuller to "explain" what was intended by the
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language contained in the lease, did not lend clarity
to the instrument but only served to confuse its
clear meaning.
The Washington court in the case of W askington Fish and Oyster Company vs. G. B. Halferty
and Company, 269 P. 2d 806 (Wash. 1954), dealt
with a very similar question. The court rejected
oral explranations of the type permitted in this case
because they were opinions which were "mere legal
conclusions and carry no weight". However, such
testimony is objectionable for an even more fundamental reason. The court quoted with approval from
the earlier case of Van Doren Roofing and Cornice
Company vs. Guardian Casualty and Guaranty Company, 99 Wash. 68, 168 P. 1124, 1129:
"The rule is universal that the written contract itself must be resorted to as the source
of authority for receiving parol evidence.
Parol evidence is never admissible to create
an ambiguity, but only to explain or remove
an ambiguity apparent on the face of the instrument, or to identify a subject-rootter
otherwise uncertain (Emphasis added)
See also Scahwieger vs. Harry W. Robins and Company, 290, P. 2d 984 (Wash. 195S).
Since the court considers certain that which
can be made certain DeLong vs. Starkey, 92 N.E. 2d
2'28 ( In'd.), the lranguage contained in Paragraph
8 of the lease cannot be considered ambiguous, if
22
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through the use of a common sense interpretation
and the application of rules of construction, it can
be given meaning.
It is submited th'at the language contained in
Paragraph 8 of the lease on its f'ace is clear and
certain in meaning. It is not surprising that Mr.
Russell, ten years following the execution of the
original lease and after Mr. Valentine invested
$35,000.00 in capital improvements on what was
previously farm ground ( T. 59) , should have second
thoughts concerning the lease and now assert that
he did not intend to give an option to renew it.
Aside from the parol evidence rule which precludes
him from testifying as to the intended meaning of
a signed lease, it is so self-serving in view of the
"windfall" which would result that his testimony
bears no credence whatever.
CONCLUSION
The defendant and ~appellant respectfully contends that Paragraph 8 of the lease relating to the
renewal, is by all rules of legal construction, and by
the terms of the lease itself, clear, unambiguous and
definite. It means, as clearly expressed by the ordinary use of the English language, that the lessee
should have the right to renew the lease for a further or additional period, which is the same as the
term of the original lease ; that is, ten years. The
23
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appeUant respectfully requests that the Judgment
of the District Court in and for Weber County be
reversed and the case remanded to the District Court
with directions for that court to enter a finding
that the renewal provision of the lease is unambiguous and the lessee had the option and the right to
renew the same for a period of ten years beginning
at the termin'ation of the period of time of the
original lease, and make a finding that the lessee
exercised the option to renew, in accordance with
the terms and provisions of the lease for an additional ten years, and that appellant, Grant L. Valentine, is entitled to the possession and occupancy
of the property under terms and conditions of the
said lease.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON AND BALDWIN AND
MERLIN R. LYBBERT
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendnnt
and Appellant
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